

HUNTER: – My name is David Hunter. I'm the school's acting dean. And it's a privilege to be here to be able to welcome everybody – members of the Harvard Chan School community, faculty, students, staff as well as members of our extended community, the Leadership Council and friends.

For a perspective on communications and disaster response, we now turn to our keynote presentation, Swarm Intelligence – Communication in Crises. It'll give us a special behind-the-scenes look at a defining event that happened right here in Boston, the Boston Marathon bombings of 2013 – as Lenny (sp?) Marcus has noted, 102 hours that Boston will long remember.

What you may not have realized at the time was, despite the many, many agencies that were involved in the hunt for the bombers and the response, there was no one person who was labeled as officially in charge of every aspect of the entire operation. Yet, as we saw, events unfolded in a systematic way that produced the desired outcome, both immediately and in the later finding and stopping the perpetrators.

We're deeply honored today to have former governor Deval Patrick with us this afternoon to talk about events as they unfolded over those 102 hours. Not only was he a two-term governor of Massachusetts, but he actually holds three Harvard degrees – a bachelor's degree from the college, a JD degree from Harvard Law School – and many of us were privileged to see him accept an honorary Doctor of Laws degree at commencement this year.

Originally from the South Side of Chicago, he came to Massachusetts at age 14, where he was awarded a scholarship to Milton Academy through the Boston-based organization A Better Chance. After graduating from law school, he clerked for a federal appellate judge and then launched a career as an attorney and business executive, becoming partner at two Boston law firms and a senior executive at Texaco and Coca Cola.

In 1994, President Clinton appointed Deval to the nation's top civil rights post, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. In 2006, in his first bid for public office, he became the state's first African American governor. During his two terms, he oversaw the expansion of the Affordable Care Act to more than 98% of state residents. He launched initiatives stimulating clean energy and biotechnology. We're still enjoying the fruits of those initiatives today. He won a national Race to the Top grant and steered the state out of recession to a 25-year high in employment.

He currently serves as managing director of Bain Capital, LLC, where he focuses on investments that deliver both a competitive financial return and significant positive social impact. He is a Rockefeller Fellow, a Crown Fellow of the Aspen Institute and the author of two books, *A Reason to Believe – Lessons from an*

Improbable Life and Faith in the Dream – A Call to the Nation to Reclaim American Values.

Joining Governor Patrick in today's conversation about the marathon bombing and its aftermath is Dr. Leonard Marcus, the founding director of the Program for Health Care Negotiation and Conflict Resolution at the Harvard Chan School, as well as founding co-director of the National Preparedness Leadership Initiative, a joint program of the Harvard Chan School and the Harvard Kennedy School.

Moderating today's discussion will be Dr. Barry Dorn, who is associate director of the Program for Health Care Negotiation and Conflict Resolution and lecturer in public health practice here at the Harvard Chan School. He's also a faculty member of the National Preparedness Leadership Initiative. In addition to his work with us at the Harvard Chan School, Barry is a clinical professor of orthopedic surgery at Tufts University School of Medicine.

So please join me in welcoming Governor Deval Patrick, Harvard Chan's Lenny Marcus and Barry Dorn for what promises to be a fascinating presentation.
(applause)

DORN: So as Dean Hunter said, I'm the moderator. And this is actually just going to be a conversation. The governor has been kind enough to spend many hours with Lenny and with me talking about the Boston Marathon and what were the leadership lessons learned. And we have learned much from that.

So I am going to ask the governor and Lenny a series of questions to sort of frame the event and frame what happened at that particular event. We will leave some time at the end for some questions from the audience, so you can sort of think about what you'd like to ask us. Also we all will be here afterwards to talk to you if you have any questions that we haven't covered in today's conversation. So Governor, it's always nice to see you.

PATRICK: Doctor.

DORN: The Boston Marathon occurred during your seventh year as governor of this state. And you had been in many emergency situations before and many crisis situations in those seven years. And as you know, we study leadership and we study what happens to people during crisis. What in those seven years do you feel helped prepare you to handle the events of that particular 102 hours that we went through?

PATRICK: Was it only 102 hours? (laughter) A couple things – we talked about this before – one, as you mentioned in the question, we had had a lot of practice at dealing with emergencies and crises – blizzards, a tornado in western Massachusetts. There was a water main break – you remember –

M: Yes.

PATRICK: – that cut off potable water to two and a half million people in eastern Massachusetts. We thought we were going to be without access to drinking water for three or four months. We managed to get that solved in three days, I think it was. So this team of various emergency responders, agency leads – and frankly partners in the private sector as well, medical community and beyond – had had a lot of time together. And we trusted each other. We knew each other. We knew what our capabilities were. I knew that a part of my role was to ask others what they needed from me in terms of support and encouragement.

And then the part of the – you know, I say about being governor – jobs like it – and I say this as a relative amateur, having run for only one office – is that the job is a combination of substance and performance art. And it took me a while to get the performance art part of it and the importance of that. But in a crisis, the communications bit is critical, even when you don't have a lot to say. I'm talking about to the general public. So all of those were lessons from having gone through a whole bunch of pretty high-pressured situations before.

DORN: Where you had built many of those communication links already in the –

PATRICK: Right.

DORN: So Lenny, we teach and study leadership at the NPLI. So what do you take from what the governor has told us as lessons that we have learned and incorporated in our teaching of our students that we have in the NPLI:

MARCUS: Well, there are two things. There are two things that we observed about your leadership that week that were extraordinary. And we weren't only hearing it from you and observing what you were doing. We heard the same thing from all the other leaders that we interviewed, including all the people that were reporting to you.

And I think the two things that were most effective were we've been in many crises where an elected official has to take on a leadership role. We were there during Katrina. We observed a lot of governors in the Gulf states during the Deepwater Horizon. And one of the problems that can happen in a crisis like this is that the elected official can panic. And when the elected official panics, they start becoming very operational. And when they become operational, they're jumping in to expertise that really belongs to all of the agency heads that are reporting to them. And that really complicates the scenario.

Two things that we observed in talking with you – and we heard them from everyone who was part of your team – is that you came in and said how can I be helpful? And you gave them the freedom to bring their expertise, to bring their

authority and to bring their resources to the table so that they could truly work together.

The other thing in terms of communication – and this is what we teach in the NPLI – is leaders need to say this is what we know and what we're doing about it. This is what we don't know and what we're doing to learn more. And this is what you should do in the community. And in all of your communications, you were really consistent about it because, as Dean Hunter said, there was a lot that was not known that week.

And people were very anxious about what isn't known. I mean, when we studied the Ebola response, again there was a lot of anxiety about what wasn't known. And how elected officials and how senior leaders communicate to the public will often make the difference between whether they're panicked or whether they're cooperative. And in many ways, the outcome of that cooperation came on that last day, when you asked people to shelter in place. There was no law that required them to do it. And yet this whole community sheltered in place because you asked them to do it.

DORN: Governor, the day of the bombing, where were you when the bombs went off? And talk about your experience over the next hours of that day.

PATRICK: Oh, boy. How many of you are from Boston? So a bunch of you. So the custom, as those of you from Boston will know, is that the governor places the wreath on the winner of the women's elite runner, and the mayor for the men's elite runner. And Mayor Menino, who was mayor at the time, was in the hospital. And I was with him that morning in the hospital, actually, visiting with him and trying to find out as he was trying to decide whether he could go to the race that day. And his doctor said no, you have to stay put. And he asked if I would do the honors for both the men and the women's winners.

So I was at the finish line relatively early. And I left, I would say, around 12:30 – something like that. And I had a thing of real beauty for a public official, which is a day without appointments. (laughter) And it was a glorious day – absolutely stunning day. I'm a gardener, and my wife was out of town, and I thought I'm going to go and mess around in the soil for the rest of the day. I went and got a workout. And I was driving home on the Southeast Expressway.

And my youngest daughter – our youngest daughter – called. And she lived at the time in the South End. And she was in the Back Bay. And she called, and she said Dad, there was just a big boom, and everybody's running. What happened? And I said I don't know. I hadn't heard anything. And I said but, you know, stay out of the way.

And very soon after that, Kurt Shwartz, whom you know – Dave knows – who is the head of the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency – called from the

finish line – actually he was in the medical tent when the first explosion went off – and said Governor, something’s happened. We got a mess down here. And he was really shaken. And Kurt doesn’t shake easily. He said something’s happened. We need to set up a command center, and we’d like to have you come down.

So I told the trooper to turn the truck around and go down to the finish line. He said I’ll turn the truck around, but I don’t want to go to the finish line. And he explained that – it’s interesting how you understand things differently in retrospect than at the time – understand there were two explosions. We didn’t know whether they were a gas main break explosion or something like that. And we didn’t know whether it was over. That was the other thing. So they didn’t want to get close and – my security detail.

So I said, well let’s go to the State House. And they said, well, if there’s something going down, the State House is a target. We don’t want to be there. Let’s go to the bunker. And we have a bunker out in – we – the state has a bunker. It used to be mine. It’s not mine. (laughter) The state has a bunker out in Framingham, which is frankly where we had managed many crises in the past. There’re lots of communications, great big space. It’s just like something you see in the movies. But Framingham did not seem like the place where we needed to be. So we went to the State House.

By the time I got to the State House, every law enforcement lead, state and federal and local, were trying to get close to the scene. We decided we’d have the command center at the Westin, which was just a block away, and so I went there.

DORN: Everyone went to the Westin?

PATRICK: Everyone. I mean you’ve never seen so much heat. It was remarkable.

DORN: Did you have difficulty convincing your guards and the state police to take you to the Westin?

PATRICK: Well, you know, the convincing – they worked for me. (laughter) But I mean they were – everybody was nervous. We didn’t – really, we didn’t know. And it’s actually an interesting – we talked about this too – on Friday, the shelter in place was not arrived at – it was not the first decision and it wasn’t arrived at lightly because we thought there was more going down, based on the data we had at the time, than even the considerable amount that was happening.

DORN: So Lenny, in the research that we’ve done at the NPLI with the governor and all the other leaders of the Boston Marathon, what were some of the key themes and priorities that you could take from that?

MARCUS: So what we found extraordinary was there were a lot of different agencies working together. Now, when we teach this case to our students at the school, we

ask them, where did the marathon bombings happen? Well, some will say Boston. Some will say, no, no, no, it was Massachusetts because it was multijurisdictional. And other people say it was a terrorist event – it happened in the United States. So this was an extraordinarily complex event, because you had all of those agencies coming in. You were the senior elected official on scene in that period.

And what was remarkable to us is there were a lot of people in charge of different aspects of the response – federal agencies, FBI. The hospitals were taking care of patients. There were a lot of different people responsible for different aspects. And yet no one was in charge of the whole thing – of the overall umbrella – because there were federal aspects, there were state, local.

And what was extraordinary to us – and I think you set the tone and other people picked up the tone, and it went all the way out to the community – was a phenomenon that we call swarm intelligence. And the difference that we saw in this response from other times where we were – in Deepwater Horizon, we saw Admiral Thad Allen taking charge of that or we were – in Hurricane Sandy, we saw FEMA take charge of that response – or the CDC during H1N1. In this case, there wasn't one overriding agency that was clearly in charge. And yet you worked together so well.

And we had interviewed you. We interviewed all those agency heads. We had a focus group for all the hospitals, talked with businesses and the community, and it didn't make sense to us, because that command and control wasn't there. So one day our colleague Eric McNulty walked into our office, and he said swarm intelligence. And I said, well, what's that? And we started reading what we could about swarm intelligence and leadership.

And of course this is the way creatures – ants, termites, birds – are able to coordinate their efforts so well without one particular creature saying I'm completely in charge. And they do so by operating by certain principles. And so we went through all of our interviews, including our interview with you and the FBI and everyone else.

And so if swarm intelligence – and we started with the question if – swarm intelligence were operating in this response, what would the principles have been? And we came up with five principles. One was unity of mission – save lives. And everyone in every one of our interviews – that was the first thing that people talked about. The second one was generosity of spirit and action. Everybody was ready to help. And we talked with people in the private sector. They were handing over the videos. We talked to people out at Target (sp?) during the manhunt. They were handing over cell phones.

And all the way out to the community, we asked, you know, how were the people who were the tactical guys out there being taken care of? And nobody had sent

them out food and water. And when they went from house to house, people made sure they had food and water.

The third thing was everybody stayed in their own lanes. Everybody did their job and helped others succeed in theirs, whether it was law enforcement or the hospitals or the businesses.

The fourth rule of swarm intelligence that we saw was no ego, no blame – not to say that it was kumbaya. There were tense moments. However, for the most part, nobody was saying I did it, and nobody was going around pointing fingers.

And the fifth rule was a foundation of trusting relationships. Your team had been working together for many years together. They knew one another. And that tone, which you had with your team, then became the tone that went out to the other agencies that became involved, including the federal agencies, and all the way out to the community.

And those five principles of swarm intelligence, we found, were extraordinarily helpful to the nature of the response and the quality of the response that you were able to lead.

DORN: So you mentioned something in the very beginning. You talked about relationships that you had and you'd built over time. So we have been trying to figure out, could we take this concept of swarm intelligence and could we apply it to Philadelphia or New York or Chicago? Is it possible? There's something unique about our particular culture at this particular event.

So talk a little bit about that. I mean we all know we have the state of Massachusetts and we have the state of Boston, so we know that that's (inaudible; laughter). And I know you were the governor, so talk a little bit about that foundation of relationships, how that got built, how that was augmented over time.

PATRICK: Well, first of all, I want to thank you, Dr. Marcus, for the really generous ways you described how we came – I wish we could call it something other than swarm intelligence. Swarm sounds a little –

MARCUS: Collective intelligence

PATRICK: There – OK.

MARCUS: There you go. OK.

PATRICK: Well, first of all, I think, as I said earlier, it was important that we had had the experience of dealing with other crises with many of these agencies – not all of them but many of them.

I had had the experience, as I think we talked about earlier, in a previous life, when I worked in the Clinton Justice Department and was in charge of an investigation of attacks on black churches and synagogues at the time, which was at the time, before 9-11, the largest criminal investigation in American history. And there were a number of agencies working on that that just could not get along.

So the experience – that experience – is the reason why, the night of the first day, we got all the law enforcement agencies together, and I said, look, everybody has a role, but one agency has to be in charge of the criminal investigation. That's not the whole of it, but the criminal investigation. And I said I don't care who it is, but one of you has to be it. And in very short conversation, folks agreed it should be the FBI. And then I looked every agency head in the eye, and I said are you agreed, are you agreed, are you agreed? And they all agreed. And on the whole, that helped. And it helped – from the perspective of the criminal investigation.

And then we were constantly asking ourselves and others, what are the other things that have to happen? There were people who needed to be healed. There were merchants who needed to be healed. There were communities that needed to be – there were families of runners who were waiting for their family – waiting for the contestant at the end of the race. The race was stopped, as you recall. And they needed to figure out how to find each other again – many of them from out of town. There were visitors who had come in as spectators. We had to worry about all that.

But there were folks who knew these different constituencies, if you will. And they had to be at the table. And it was true that I knew many – because I had been in office for a while and – but I do want to say I don't think it is – I'm glad we had that practice, but I hope it doesn't depend on your having a preexisting relationship.

I mean suppose this had happened in the first few hours of the first administration. We'd have had to figure it out then to, with no less exigency. And I hope that – I'm sure we benefited from the fact that the mayor and I knew each other and we worked on stuff together – the head of MEMA, the head of the National Guard. The president was magnificent in putting federal resources at our disposal and many of the players I knew. But a prior existing relationship was helpful but ought not be a prerequisite.

DORN: One of the other things Lenny said that you were giving – you said what can I give you – and it's funny because Scott Rice, our adjutant general from Massachusetts, is in our present NPLI class. So we said to General Rice, so, you know, what was your role? He said, well, I'm like a supply sergeant. If the governor needs something, then I just give it to him, he said, but I didn't really have a role. And I think a lot of people said that – I didn't really have a role – yet they had a very, very important role.

PATRICK: They were critical. Everybody was critical. I mean, for example, you wanted to assure that there was enough law enforcement or military presence –

again because we didn't know whether it was over, we didn't know how extensive – and we didn't know if there were other bombs and other people – but not so much that people were in a state of panic. And that's a balance. And we were toggling that.

So for example, the National Guard was checking parcels and backpacks and so on on the T. And we asked them to do that without their service weapons. It was a pretty delicate call, actually. Some of them were not happy about it. The general was marvelous. But if there had been trouble in the T, we were taking a certain risk. But we were trying to strike a balance.

M: Which also showed some respect for the mayor, who said that, you know, I don't want National Guard troops in my city, so –

PATRICK: No. I mean God bless him – you know, the mayor wanted Boylston Street reopened the next day.

M: I know.

PATRICK: And I totally got it. His point was that the more we tamp down the – the more we get back to normal, the more likely it is we tamp down the anxiety, which is completely understandable – except that it was a crime scene, and the investigation of that crime scene required, as you know, little quadrants – little squares of – it's like a standard square – is it a foot or a –

M: Yeah, 12 by 12.

PATRICK: – 12 by 12 four (sp?) blocks. And every piece of shrapnel measured and photographed – frankly, folks wanted to go down to the – we had some elected officials who showed up who said we should go down to the bomb scene – blast scene – that night. There were body parts and casualties. It's not appropriate.

M: It was not (inaudible).

PATRICK: And so you're constantly having to have those conversations about striking the right balance.

DORN: Yeah. One of the difficult questions when we're studying the response leadership and certainly what we try to teach is how do you anticipate what's going to happen next. And you just mentioned that. And it turned out to be, we think, one of the key elements of building that intelligence, because as a group of leaders – again, we were studying you as a group of leaders – you weren't living in the moment. You were living in the next moment.

And what people said of you and what we heard from you and what we heard from all of the key leaders there is that they were anticipating what was the next

decision, what assets would we need next or what will we have to do next. And because you were staying ahead of the event, you were able to provide that leadership.

PATRICK: Thank you.

DORN: How were you charting where it was going – because this was an event like nothing that had happened in this city or in this country.

PATRICK: Well, I think – I really – I've said it a couple times, but I cannot underestimate – or I cannot overstate how much anxiety I had about whether we were at the end or in the middle of this. Who else is out there? Who else – are there unexploded devices? Is it happening – is this a part of something that's about to sweep across the state – across, the city, across the state, maybe across the country? How do we get that intelligence? And the Secret Service, the CIA, the FBI – absolutely marvelous about – National Security Advisor to the president was sharing – the president was following the intelligence personally and sharing that intelligence with me, which was very, very helpful.

So, for example, on that Friday, if I can jump to that – so Friday was the day when the perpetrators were in one case killed, the other captured. The morning of the shootout or the night of the shootout – Thursday night, early Friday morning – I got the first call – actually it was the first decent night's sleep I thought I was going to get. The president had been in town on Thursday. We'd had a really important memorial service. And then I got the first call, I want to say, around 1:00 in the morning that there had been a carjacking and a shooting. And then I got calls every hour until the – well, until and beyond the shootout in Watertown.

And so the judgment was – the question put to me was, because the younger brother was on the loose, do we start up the bus line that runs through Watertown at its regular time at, I want to say, 6:00 in the morning, for fear that he might get on a bus and escape the scene? And that was the only question. That was the only question.

And so I asked, well, how – you know, are there any other lines that come through? No, just the bus line – that's it. That's all you have to do. Do you have a sense where he is? Yes, we do. Have you sealed the neighborhood? Yes, we have. When did you seal the neighborhood? Well, we sealed the neighborhood at whatever it was – 5:00 in the morning or something like that.

Well, when – how much time was there between when you sealed the neighborhood and when you lost track? And it was like two hours. And I said, well, wait a second, how far could you get in that two hours before you sealed the neighborhood? So there were estimates about what other communities he might have gotten to, which then raised bigger questions about how much of the T to suspend, if that presented a risk of flight. So the decision was to suspend T service

and to ask people in that neighborhood – just that neighborhood – to shelter in place and people in the surrounding neighborhoods to basically watch it.

And on the way to make this announcement, we learned that there was a man who fit the description of the perpetrator being pursued by federal agents by the courthouse downtown, in the seaport area, that there was a taxi that had been stopped in the Fenway right over here with an explosive device in it and a man who fit the description of the perpetrator stopped by the police, that a taxi had left the Watertown area with a fare – the Watertown area where the perpetrator had last been seen with a fare direct to South Station in time for the first train to New York.

So we had no idea how much was going on. And that then led to questions about, you know, can you surgically seal the T? You can't, by the way. And what is the area of activity here – which led to the decision between 6:00 in the morning and the time we made the announcement of asking people to shelter in place through the day. And we ultimately stopped the train outside of New Haven – the Amtrak train outside of New Haven. There was a fire at the Kennedy Library. You remember, there was that?

M: Yes.

PATRICK: Yeah, I mean all this stuff – so this is sort of the fog of it all. So I guess I just keep coming back to the fact there were decisions we made based on information that not everybody had in the general public but that were about the critical mission of keeping people safe.

M: And as social scientists, usually when we study a crisis, there's only one crisis. In this particular case, there were really two crises. There was the crisis where you were leading together on Monday, and there was a crisis when you were leading together on Friday.

M: Which were actually connected.

M: Which were connected. And what everyone told us is that the leadership came together with extraordinary unity of mission and unity of action on Friday because you had had that extra dose of practice on Monday.

PATRICK: Good. I'm glad to hear that.

DORN: So do you want to tell the audience anything else, sir, before I ask them if they want to ask you questions now?

PATRICK: Well let's find out what's on –

DORN: So feel free to ask us or the governor – he knows more about it than we do – any questions you may have about this particular – yes, ma'am?

F: I just wanted to tell you we are not from the Boston area, but everyone in the whole country was impressed with Boston. And I had friends from Boston who said do we know how to do things or what? Can you hear me? I don't know. Boston was really impressive – incredible. You found those two men – terrorists – within days. And how about the person who owned the boat? I was very impressed with his bravery –

M: I know.

F: – saying, you know what, I saw this fellow. That was incredible. Everything was amazing. (applause)

PATRICK: Thank you for – thank you. (applause) I would say two things. First of all – three – thank you very much for the comment. One has to be careful not to overlook the role of luck in all this. We had some lucky breaks. But the other thing that was really true is that everybody brought their best – everybody brought their best. And I'm not just talking about the law enforcement professionals or the medical professionals or – regular people brought grace and a sense of community to this. The community helped identify those young men.

And there was a big, big conversation about whether to bring the community into that conversation and start asking people for their selfies and their cell phone videos and so forth. And there were some – you know, one has seen in other communities how the community sometimes takes a sour turn when individuals are identified. We did not pull apart that way. We did not start going after everybody who was swarthy and dark and so on. So I'm really –

And we made a point, by the way, of calling out those acts of grace and community in the course of the week, and that kind of had an energy that fed everyone too.

M: There's a lot of discussion now about resilience and what are the factors that contribute to resilience. And again the research showed that the factors that one would want to have in place to create a resilient community were there. In many ways the leaders set that tone. And it really went all the way out to the community, even to people who – this notion of Boston strong was very alive in this community.

M: Yes, sir?

M: It was a very tragic moment indeed. We made some mistakes. We learned a lot. Now, is there – from the experiences, is there a cookbook now that, the next time, we do not make the same mistakes and we add to the swarm intelligence or collective intelligence we got from this experience?

PATRICK: Well, we do, in the state agencies, an after-action report after every event – the successful ones and the not-so-successful ones. And there was one done in this case. I think a couple of the things that – from the sublime to the ridiculous – maybe on the ridiculous end – it turns out there is no place beyond the bunker in Framingham where the governor and other key political or law enforcement leaders across agencies can be that is secure.

So we have created – I mean, let me tell you, on one of the critical days – I think it was Friday – I had trouble finding a television where I could just find out what the media was saying about what was happening. We have such a thing now. I can't tell you where it is, but we have such a thing.

I think that we were extraordinarily lucky that there were not injuries of friendly fire on Friday at the – and I'll tell you something else that was a remarkable thing and in this sort of category of good things that need to be highlighted. When Dzhokhar was taken out of the boat and put on a gurney, one of my security detail was out there in his flak jacket with a long gun.

And he described how any one of a couple hundred law enforcement would have gladly put a bullet in him at that point. And when Dzhokhar was wheeled past – not a single gesture of disrespect. The restraint showed by law enforcement in a very emotional moment was enormous. And that we needed to celebrate too. That's a lesson. But there was a kind of law enforcement – is chaos too strong a term – there was –

M: (overlapping conversation; inaudible). Yes, that's a word that was used – yes.

PATRICK: Because folks volunteered themselves from every law enforcement agency within an hour, maybe more. So there were hundreds of –

M: Thousands.

PATRICK: – thousands – OK – men and women with guns in Watertown in the afternoon of the – and that's a very hard thing to control.

M: One thing I just want – first, I want to thank you for sharing what you've learned. And Billy Evans, who's the commissioner of Boston police was in the NPLI. Tim Alben was in the NPLI as well. So these leaders have shared their lessons, and this is what we're teaching to the NPLI to people in law enforcement, in health, in public health, CDC and counterintelligence and the military – to take these lessons and then to make them the way we do things in this country. And that really – thanks to the generosity of people who are willing to share those leadership lessons.

M: Yes, ma'am?

F: Thank you. We're a wonderful and, as you say, very fortunate community. But the future is uncertain. And maybe this is a question for Leonard Marcus – how do we scale this up? How do we apply what you've learned here nationally? Even if he had gotten to – if he had gotten to New York, it would have been a whole different question. And would those same dynamics have applied?

M: Well, we're a school, so we believe in education and we believe in training. And we oftentimes see that there are agencies that are competing with one another. When Barry and I started this work, we were asked by the federal government after 9-11 to focus on leadership for Homeland Security. That's how we got into this.

And the first thing we were told when we got to Washington is you got to break down the silos. Everybody is siloed. Everybody is working against one another. And we said, no, you've got to have very strong silos. You've got to have very strong agencies. And they need to learn to work together. And we call that meta-leadership.

And that's been the theme of the NPLI and certainly, as we've gone from crisis to crisis, we've seen a lot of times when it didn't work – I mean it certainly didn't work in Katrina, and there are other times when it didn't work as well as it could have – and then to find moments when it really works extraordinarily well – to take those lessons and then to teach them and to set that as the standard, that this should be the expectation.

And the message that we're teaching leaders around the country is that prepare yourself for the possibility of engaging in a swarm or a collective leadership scenario because you'll produce more and – most importantly – you'll be able to engage in a very complex catastrophic event a lot of people who you really need to be part of that response – if the country will be resilient if we're challenged in the future.

M: Yes, sir?

M: So Governor, thank you for sharing this with us and –

PATRICK: Thank you.

M: – thank you for a spectacular eight years.

M: So we have this idea of collective intelligence – actually leaderless collective intelligence. And it applied here – you alluded to it – because you knew everybody. You knew their capabilities, and you were willing to trust them. How is that going to work where we show up and we assemble teams for different reasons all the time? How do we do that without a leader when you don't know people's capabilities? And what do you see – how applicable is that going forward?

PATRICK: Do you want me to try that?

M: Yeah, please. Yeah.

PATRICK: So I was trying to get at this earlier, because I think we need to encourage this kind of collaborative problem solving or response without it being dependent on preexisting relationships, because we won't always have that advantage.

And by the way, we didn't have it in every agency that was – I didn't know the folks at the CIA, for example, or National Security. I didn't have a preexisting relationship. I knew the previous SAC – not the current – the FBI lead – not the one who was in place at the time. I met him that day. Many of the agencies practiced together. And it's called the – is it Joint Counterterrorism Task Force? What's the name of the –

M: Yes. (overlapping conversation; inaudible), yeah.

PATRICK: JTT – so they – and that, by the way, I think was put in place after –

M: 9-11.

PATRICK: – 9-11. So at the federal level, led by the federal agencies, state police and National Guard practice with them. They do tabletops and all that, and that's enormously important, I think.

You know, the part of the response that I think sometimes we kind of blow past when we talk about the Boston Marathon was that the hospitals had also practiced their responses. They had practiced – that we put in place – by the way, I didn't know until the day after, when I was at one of the hospitals and they said we practice your plan. And I said, well, great. What was it? (laughter) But they had practiced how to triage so that no one hospital was overwhelmed with more than they could handle at the level of acuity if that – the severity of the injuries

You know, a luck thing is that the first explosion was at the finish line and the second was a block away from the finish line, and right next to the finish line is the medical tent and a whole bunch of ambulances and a lot of medical professionals, who volunteered for the marathon. Now, it was a stroke of luck, except that there's – you know, after many, many years of learning from marathons, we'd known to have a lot of medical professionals at the end. Would it have been different had the bombs gone off at mile 12 instead of at mile 26? Do you know what I mean?

So I think the point of recognizing the blessing of having preexisting relationships but also not feeling like you can't do this in the absence of preexisting relationships is important and that practice – practice is enormously important.

M: When we started the National Preparedness Leadership Initiative, one of our students said this is great – you’re teaching 50 people a year from the government. We now have over 700. But he said you’re teaching 50 people a year, so what are you accomplishing? So he said I think we should teach every major city. So Lenny and I did 38 –

M: Thirty-six.

M: – 36 major cities, where we brought together the three sectors – public, private, not-for-profit.

M: I don’t know if we shared this with you, but as part of the research, we did a focus group with all the emergency and trauma physicians in town. We brought them together. They said it was the first time they’d all been together in the same room, which is another story. And we asked them what happened. And we had one of those voting questionnaires.

PATRICK: Those instant (overlapping conversation; inaudible) .

M: Yeah. And so it turned out that – and they didn’t know this of one another – in every single hospital, the electronic medical record went down. It couldn’t keep up with the pace of people coming in. So they had no way of identifying people or tracking people.

So they instantly figured out a system – and every hospital the same system – of they were writing medical orders on foreheads and they were giving identifiers – mustache with – yeah – and they were able to perfectly track all of those people because of the leadership in each hospital. That happened simultaneously. And that goes back to the exercising and the plan – that they could figure out how to operate correctly even though they didn’t have all of their resources with them.

M: Yes, Jonathan (sp?)?

M: Have you looked in your work to how to use this in everyday life to prevent – so you hear about people had incredible faith in what was going on. And you contrast that to the VA stories and various reasons people criticize government. And what you describe should be how lots of organizations run all the time. And yet there’s something about it takes a crisis to make it all work. Have you tried to extend your work on a preventative basis?

M: Yeah, so there’re two pieces that we’re working on right now. And we handed out a sheet of paper that just gives a hint of that. One of them is, yeah, we think that, if you’re going to be able to respond well in a crisis, this ought to be the way you work every day.

So we're looking at the relationship between swarm or collective intelligence and building a good team, so that, if you want to be a great Olympic athlete on the day of the Olympics, you don't start practicing on the day of the event. You are doing this all the way. It's part of your discipline. And so we're linking that to the literature and linking that to the work we're doing for how organizations should run every single day.

The other thing – and this is where we're really sort of at the edge – we think that humans are programmed to swarm – that we are tribal by our very nature. All of us – in my family – my family lived in a tribe or in a swarm just one generation ago. My mom and dad grew up a block and a half from one another, and the whole family was in three blocks. Now we're spread all over the place. And so we humans have a desire to help one another, to be connected with one another. We have lost that, and we're losing that in the digital age. We're losing that because we've moved all over the place.

And we believe that what you were able to bring out and what the other leaders were able to bring out was that sense of connectivity – that sense of resilience. That's why Boston did so well. And we think there's a lot more to learn about that and there's a lot more to build in to how leaders lead, because we certainly believe that communities need that and our country needs that right now.

M: Back of the room – ma'am?

F: Me?

M: Yes, you.

F: Thank you. Gentlemen, I have a question for you. It seems that the most important collective information that helped you find the perpetrators were the videos. Am I correct in saying that? The videos – that you were able to identify them –

PATRICK: They helped significantly.

F: That's what I thought.

PATRICK: There was some other intelligence. But that was enormously important.

F: Yes. Well I live in Harvard Square. And there are people who feel that having those videos in communities, like they do in London – that it's violating a person's rights. And I was just wondering if you had any comments about that.

PATRICK: You know what, it's so interesting – some of the same people who tell me about their – and I say this as a civil rights lawyer, so I'm very sympathetic to the notion of being watched – some of the same people who were advocates with me about – as a civil rights lawyer – about the intrusiveness of cameras were awfully

glad those cameras were in place on that day. Now, they – by the way, they weren't public cameras. They were – I mean public in the sense they weren't city or state cameras. They were security cameras for the shops and then people's –

F: Cells.

M: Yeah, cell phones.

PATRICK: Smartphones (inaudible).

M: In fact Alan Snow, who takes care of Boston Properties, submitted a tremendous amount – I mean they (overlapping conversation; inaudible) – they have cameras (inaudible) nowhere, but they submitted a lot of material. So I think what the governor is saying is a lot of information came in, and I don't think most of it was from public cameras.

PATRICK: No. In fact I don't think there – I'm not sure I'm right, but I don't think there are any public cameras right down there. You know what's interesting is my kids have a completely different feel about their – a completely different expectation about their anonymity really and their privacy. It's a very peculiar generational thing. (laughter)

M: Actually what the governor says – we teach our students that most of you in this room – you grew up in the industrial age, and you think that way. OK? Our kids and our grandchildren grew up in the digital age. They don't even think like we do. And I think that's what you're saying – that it's a totally different way of doing – and we have to – that's one of the things that we have to learn – that when we go into other communities, Jonathan, and we go into other organizations, how do you marry these two things together, because it's really critical.

F: Oh, thanks. My questions about the role of the bystander and the public. It's very valuable that all these agencies work well together. But as we saw with the recent train incident, 9-11, all these incidents, the public and the bystander has to become an immediate responder, it seems like. And the White House just launched the Stop the Bleed about bringing military tourniquets and gauze to the public sector. Just thoughts on what we normal people – laypeople – can do and lessons learned for next time, so that we can respond better faster.

PATRICK: Now, so – may I?

M: Yeah, please.

PATRICK: So when I said earlier that, for me, the extraordinary thing is that everyone brought their best, I mean to include bystanders – members of the general public. And folks were listening. This is another part of – another lesson I learned about

how important it is to communicate regularly. We had one really tough day when there wasn't enough communication. That was our hardest day, in the middle.

But folks are listening for little instructions – you know, like if there is a runner outside your house and you're close to the route, go get them, bring them inside, wrap them in a blanket and stand by. And folks did. And they helped. It wasn't just agency – official people – folks did – and helping, as you said, identify the perpetrators by offering their cell phone photographs or videos. We got tons of that stuff. And the officials at the FBI, the CIA and the National Security Agency and the state police went through all that – every bit. So it was enormously important.

I'm not sure I'm at the point of saying, you know, everybody should have a defibrillator in their – or something like that. But the point is that we – this was not the success of official agencies alone. It was the success of this whole community acting like a community, which is the point you made.

M: So in that spirit, we – since our work on the Boston Marathon bombings – studied the Ebola response. We were at the CDC, we were at the White House – studying in the moment. We've worked with the Secret Service.

And people have said, well, so what's the crisis that you're working on right now? So we have now focused our attention on cyber security. This is, we believe, the emerging crisis that's facing the country. It's a very different crisis than a kinetic event with a real boom. This is something that's happening in a very, very different kind of way. It's affecting all of us, many times in ways that we can't even see. And yet it's there with financial institutions, with the critical infrastructure.

So if there are any of you that are interested in learning more about that or perhaps partnering with the NPLI on this, this is a project – we've met three times with folks down at the White House, working with the private sector as well. And in the ideal, we believe we need to bring this collective swarm intelligence to how to protect our country in a very, very critical time, so – (inaudible).

M: Governor, thank you very much on behalf of everyone in this room.

PATRICK: Thank you.

HUNTER: (inaudible). So we have a series at the school called Voices in Leadership. And we've heard certainly three voices in leadership this afternoon. We had a speaker in that series in the spring who was asked what he thought the major characteristics for leadership were. And he said a mentor had told him what they were, and there were two words – courage and stamina.

And so Governor, I'd like to thank you for the courage to run in 2006, the stamina you showed in leading the state for eight years and all your accomplishments – also

the courage you showed on the day – going back to the State House, going to the Westin Hotel, not going to the bunker – and the stamina you showed over the next 102 hours in leading the response.

As a citizen, I have to say that you actually gave a master class in communications in crisis. Obviously we were at home, sheltering in place. And your calm demeanor and your frankness and openness and your ability to say what you knew and what you didn't know were absolutely critical, I think, to keeping Boston strong and making sure that we got to the right place at the end of those five days.

Lenny and Barry, thank you so much for distilling the lessons and bringing them to us today with the governor – and everything you're doing, as you said, to prepare our officials and others if we face crises in the future. And I'd like to thank you all. Thanks for your thought-provoking questions. (applause)

END OF RECORDING